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Learning Foreign Ownership Regulations 
in China through Networks: 
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In order to explore what motivates post-entry mode change of the MNC (Multinational 
Corporation) in China, this paper proposed a theoretical framework that has highlighted 
MNC flexibility influenced by learning ownership regulations through relationship 
networks. A company is embedded in a number of relationships with identifiable 
counterparts and this web of relationships can be called a network. Learning ownership 
regulations refers to obtaining, interpreting or confirming foreign ownership regulations 
in China. In this paper, MNC flexibility is defined as the MNC’s ability to manage the 
risks and exploit the opportunities that arise from the diversity and volatility of foreign 
ownership regulations in China; Post-entry mode change is specified as the change 
from joint venture to wholly foreign-owned enterprise. Japanese subsidiaries in China 
were studied, specifically, 3 wholly foreign-owned enterprises in Shanghai, all of which 
were initially set up as joint ventures. The case studies showed that superior networks 
contribute to excellent learning ownership regulations, which leads to enhanced MNC 
flexibility, which in turn motivates post-entry mode change. However, the enhanced MNC 
flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations through superior networks can 
motivate not only the change from joint venture to wholly foreign-owned enterprise but 
also keeping joint venture.
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Introduction
Foreign ownership regulations in China have been changing since Reform and Opening 
Policy2). The Joint Venture Law3) of 1979 allowed Equity joint ventures (EJVs) between 
foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for the 
first time. Chinese government launched Law of Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises 4) 
in 1986, permitting MNCs to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) for 
the first time. At that time, however, WFOEs were allowed only in a few industries. A 
lot of industries were still closed to foreign investment (e.g. logistics, retailing, urban 
networks of water supply etc.). Gradually, some were opened for WFOEs (e.g. logistics 
was allowed in 2005), while some were only opened for JVs with or without stipulating 
that Chinese SOEs should hold majority share (e.g. urban water supply was opened in 
2002 for JVs stipulating the Chinese SOEs as the majority shareholder and in 2008 for 
JVs without such stipulation). Until 1995, the most prominent foreign ownership laws 
Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment and its appendix Catalogue 
for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industries 5) were issued. The former categorizes 
Chinese industries into those that are encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited for 
foreign investment and was revised in 2002. The latter was revised in 1997, 2002, 2004 
and 2007 respectively and these various versions altogether are called the Catalogues, 
which list industries in terms of encouraged, restricted or prohibited categories. Those 
not listed belong to the permitted category. The investment in encouraged category 
often enjoys the right to establish WFOEs, while that in restricted category is often 
limited to JVs. The prohibited category refers to industries in which foreign investment 
is completely not allowed. During the revision of the Catalogues, more and more 
2) As China’s international trade policy introduced after Deng Xiaoping took office, it is also termed as China’s policy 
of opening up to the outside world. Deng Xiaoping, under his new capitalist-inclined system that promoted market 
forces, committed China to adopting policies which promote foreign trade and economic investment. He set in train 
the transformation of China’s economy when he announced a new “open door“ policy in December 1978. Before then, 
China’s main trading partners had been the USSR and its satellites. Deng realized that China needed Western technology 
and investment, and opened the door to foreign businesses who wanted to set up in China.
3) In the 1970’s, China’s trade pacts became increasingly complicated, partly because China started engaging in 
contractual joint ventures, in which the foreign partner does not have ownership rights and the partners do not necessarily 
share risks. Economic laws are needed to provide a framework for resolving legal problems not encountered in previous 
business transactions. The equity joint venture law, enacted July 1979, is the first of these laws. In equity joint ventures, 
the foreign partner does have ownership rights and the partners share risks.
4) Adopted on 12 April 1986 at the 4th Session of the 6th National People’s Congress, Law of Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises stipulates in Article 1 that China permits foreign enterprises and other economic organizations or individuals 
to establish enterprises with sole foreign investment within Chinese territory, and this law was revised in 2000 (see http://
eastlaw.net/chineselaws/FDI/wfoel.pdf). Before the issue of this law, foreign organizations could only be allowed to set 
up joint ventures with Chinese domestic organizations.
5) In 1995, the first version was issued 
(see http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/n/200208/20020800036872.html?522833741=360834781). 
In 2002, Regulation for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment was revised 
(see http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/111845.htm)
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prohibited or restricted industries have upgraded to permitted and even encouraged 
categories, although some were downgraded from encouraged to restricted or even to 
prohibited categories (The trend can be observed through the Catalogues). In addition, 
other industry-specific regulations can make effect and may be taken priority over the 
Catalogues. Thus, foreign ownership laws and regulations in China are complex.
Due to geographic proximity, Japanese MNCs are among the pioneers investing in China. 
Since 1980, they have started setting up JVs in China (This can be observed through 
Toyo Keizai KAIGAI SHINSHUTSU KIGYO SORAN). Yan and Warner (2002, in 
Puck et al., 2009) noted that JVs can be the most popular entry mode before 1997. Most 
Japanese subsidiaries established as JVs during 1980s and 1990s are still JVs nowadays. 
Nevertheless, many of them (e.g. 11%-15% in Shanghai) were changed to WFOEs during 
2000s. More of them continue this type of change. Post-entry mode change refers to 
the MNC changes its mode of operation after initial entry into a foreign market 6). The 
change from initial JV to WFOE is a specific type of post-entry mode change. Such a 
type is focused in this paper. Then what motivates the post-entry mode change from JV 
to WFOE? How can the motives be related to the complex foreign ownership regulations 
in China? We will not simply look at the regulation itself, as the research industry is 
not specified in this paper. WFOE is allowed in some industries but hindered in others. 
Rather, we are interested in learning—obtaining, interpreting or confirming—the 
regulation through relationship networks, and the resulted MNC flexibility—the MNC’s 
ability to manage risks and opportunities that arise from the regulation.
Relationship networks are becoming increasingly more involved in international business 
studies, as Powell (1990) posited that firms are increasingly adopting network forms 
of organization and are subject to influences of non-economic factors. Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002) noted that networks are a source of learning and extracting information. 
Rangan (2000) further noted that networks are a source of learning about markets and 
institutions in the host country. Foreign institutional knowledge is the experiential 
knowledge of foreign government, institutional framework, rules, norms and values, 
including among other things the knowledge about foreign ownership regulations. Since 
knowledge is the outcome of learning process, knowledge about foreign ownership 
regulations is the outcome of learning foreign ownership regulations. Complying with 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009), I regard networks as vehicles in learning institutional 
conditions, specifically in this paper, as an important source of learning foreign ownership 
6) Post-entry mode strategy refers to mode strategy after entry into a foreign market for a period of time. Only in a 
few previous studies has the adjustment of Multinational Corporation operations to host-country conditions been linked 
to post-entry mode strategy. For example, Gomes-Casseres (1987) pointed out that mode change from joint venture to 
wholly-owned subsidiary in some cases represented adjustment to host-country conditions. Calof and Beamish (1995) 
found that mode change can arise because of adjustment to host-country markets. Post-entry mode change is a specific 
type of adjustment of post-entry mode strategy.
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regulations.
Learning ownership regulations is in effect learning about risks and opportunities that 
arise from foreign ownership regulations. This is essential to managing these risks and 
opportunities. As we utilize MNC flexibility to mean the MNC’s ability to manage the 
risks and exploit the opportunities that arise from foreign ownership regulations in China, 
learning ownership regulations impacts on MNC flexibility.
Thus, we argue that MNC flexibility influenced by learning ownership regulations 
through networks contributes to the change from initial JV to WFOE, a specific type of 
post-entry mode change. In the following, a theoretical framework about this argument 
will be developed. Then methodology and case studies on Japanese subsidiaries will be 
elaborated. Finally, discussion will be followed by conclusion.
Literature Review
1. Relationship Networks
A company is embedded in a number of relationships with identifiable counterparts 
and this web of relationships can be called a network. Powell (1990) divided inter-firm 
exchanges into market ties and network ties. The former are impersonal and constantly 
changing exchange partners; the latter are stable and keeping close social relationships. 
Impersonal market transactions become concentrated and exclusive, forming dyadic 
embedded ties, i.e. ongoing and exclusive relationships with one another. Uzzi (1997) 
argued that these dyadic embedded ties assemble into extended networks of embedded 
ties, and by this means, each firm’s ties and ties of these ties form a relationship network.
Granovetter (1985) criticized the ‘markets and hierarchies’ argument that treats social 
structural impacts on market behavior as exceptions, and combined the embeddedness 
approach with the economic approach. Uzzi (1997) commented that the combination can 
better explain economic behavior and competitiveness than the pure economic approach. 
Gulati (1999) noted that the embeddedness perspective was firstly applied to the study of 
individuals and their networks and later to firms and their interorganizational networks. 
In other words, the various types of networks can be divided to individual-level and 
organization-level. Moreover, Halinen and Tornroos (1998) utilized ‘micronet-macronet 
embeddedness’ to categorize networks from a different perspective, i.e. micronet refers to 
the network composed of only business actors whereas macronet involves both business 
and non-business actors.
Early IMP (International Marketing and Purchasing) research such as Hakansson and 
Snehota (2000) focused on business networks only with inter-firm exchange relations, 
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which are formed through interaction between firms. This tradition continues in some of 
the later and even recent studies. Madhok (1997) and Parkhe (1993) thought of inter-firm 
relations as economic exchanges due to rational calculation for each member’s resource 
needs. Coviello and Munro (1997) examined the small MNC’s network relationship with 
large MNCs for which it distributed. Forsgren et al. (2005) focused on business networks 
of market exchange relations with suppliers and customers. Similarly, Andersson et al. 
(2002) examined the effect of business embeddedness and technical embeddedness in 
subsidiary’s network with local suppliers and customers. In their computational model, 
Lin et al. (2008) searched suppliers in terms of resource needs, thus forming the network 
of exchange relations.
Another stream of research studying inter-firm networks stressed strategic alliance 
networks. According to Vyas et al. (1995), a strategic alliance is an agreement between 
two or more partners to share knowledge or resources which could be beneficial to all 
parties involved, shaped from technology and product development to manufacturing 
and marketing. Gulati and Singh (1998) noted that along its structural spectrum, joint 
ventures occupy one end, with partners creating a new entity in which they share equity 
and most closely replicate the hierarchical control features of organizations, and at the 
other end, alliances without sharing of equity and with few hierarchical controls, i.e. 
alliances with arm’s-length contracts. Madhavan et al. (1998) examined the role of key 
industry events in the creation of inter-organizational alliance networks. Gulati and 
Gargiulo (1999) evaluated the effect of attributes such as joint centrality in strategic 
alliance network on new alliance formation. Gulati (1999) highlighted that external 
resources residing in previous strategic alliance network can influence the extent to which 
firms secure information about potential partners and further influence new alliances 
treated as strategic action. Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) investigated the effect of 
network behavior in strategic technology alliances on technological performance. Zaheer 
and Venkatraman (1995) examined effects of alliance networks on the structure and 
performance. Gulati (1995) underscored the impact of alliance networks on the choice of 
alliance partners. Walker et al. (1997) focused on the role of networks in alliances with 
new partners.
Nevertheless, in terms of Welch and Wilkinson (2004), business networks in early 
research composed only of business actors such as customers, suppliers, distributors 
and competitors have been expanded to a broader concept, i.e. networks with a variety 
of relationships. Such networks should also include a firm’s relationships with non-
business actors such as government and industrial associations, as well as managers’ 
social relations, e.g. family and community ties, school and university ties, banking and 
boardroom ties, chamber of commerce and trade association ties, and employer and co-
worker ties. These relationships are as important as inter-firm relationships. Granovetter 
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(1985) asserted that all economic action is embedded in networks of social relations. 
Stated differently, networks of social relations both between and within firms are overlaid 
on business relations. Hadjikhani and Ghauri (2001) noted that even business network 
approach itself originates from social network theory. Halinen and Tornroos (1998) 
treated business networks as complex embedded structures of inter-firm relationships in 
that these relationships are embedded in broader contextual settings.
Hallen (1992) classifies networks to inter-firm level, organization-centered infrastructural 
level and person-centered infrastructural level. In his opinion, inter-firm networks include 
not only a firm’s relationships with actual exchange partners such as suppliers and 
customers but also with third parties such as legal, financial and technical consultants. 
In terms of such logic, consultant companies are regarded as business actors. On the 
other hand, infrastructural networks are composed of non-task relationships with non-
business actors. Unlike inter-firm networks, infrastructural networks are characterized 
by weak ties, which are alive and can revive when required. Organization-centered 
infrastructural networks include a focal firm’s relationships with nonbusiness actors such 
as government, trade unions, industrial federations and private-interest associations. 
Person-centered infrastructural networks develop around specific individuals both as 
businessmen and as private persons, i.e. ‘managerial ties’ referred by Peng and Luo (2000) 
and Zhang and Li (2008) as executives’ interpersonal contacts with external entities. 
The heart of networking activity is formed by contacts between people, both formally 
and informally, in both social and work situations. Hallen (1992) argued that person-
centered infrastructural networks have denser and closer ties than organization-centered 
infrastructural networks. It may explain the conclusions made by Peng and Luo (2000) 
that managerial ties with top executives of other firms and with government officials can 
improve firm performance and by Zhang and Li (2008) that managerial ties in emerging 
economies greatly influence firm growth. I regard Hallen’s classification of network 
levels (1992) as the most appropriate cross-classification, in terms of both individual/
organization-level and micronet/macronet.
A firm’s management activity is divided into business area considering interaction with 
business actors and political area involving interaction with political actors (Boddewyn, 
1988). Political actors are among nonbusiness actors. According to Hadjikhani and 
Hakansson (1996), political actors include bureaucrats, government ministers, parliament 
members, opposition parties, interest groups and the media. Political actors constitute the 
political network. Unlike industrial network characterized by longevity, political network 
features by temporality and discontinuity. In contrast, Hadjikhani (2000) incorporated 
political actors into the business network and highlighted their proactive effect on 
business actors. Following this viewpoint, I regard political actors as a constituent in the 
infrastructural network cited by Hallen (1992).
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Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) treated MNCs as networks of both internal and external 
relationships. Internally, subsidiaries exchange information horizontally with each other 
and vertically with the headquarters, thus forming a communication network. Externally, 
different subsidiaries are embedded in different local networks (host government, 
competitors, customers, suppliers, financial institutions, intermediaries, alliance partners 
etc.), and thus the MNC as a whole tends to be embedded in differentiated networks 
simultaneously. Accordingly, a subsidiary is among a complex system of multiple 
linkages of internal and external relationships. Welch and Welch (1993) identifed three 
subsidiary networks, i.e. headquarter-subsidiary network, subsidiary-subsidiary network 
and subsidiary-external environment network. Their interconnection results in a complex 
web of linkages. The link between headquarter and subsidiary is said by Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989) to be both formally by organization structure and standardized procedure 
and informally via interpersonal contact and socialization. In such a link, various actors 
exchange resources such as information. In terms of Thorelli (1986), the subsidiary-
subsidiary network features by not only interdependency and interconnectedness but 
also friction and conflict. Although Welch and Welch (1993) categorize the external 
environment into local environment, foreign environment and alliance partners, I only 
look at the local environment among which alliance partners exist. That is, operating in 
foreign markets, MNC subsidiaries have to build up relationships with a wide rage of 
organizations and individuals in the external environment including local suppliers and 
customers, host government, local labor, local competitors, stakeholders (Welch and 
Welch, 1993), as well as intermediaries, banks, government officials (Benito and Welch, 
1994), and local alliance partners. However, according to Forsgren et al. (2005), internal 
units 7) are not significantly different from external units 8) to a focal subsidiary, as the 
subsidiary may depend on local external units to the same extent as or even more than 
on sister subsidiaries and headquarters. Similarly, relationships among the internal units 
are regarded by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) as inter-organizational, just as the internal 
units’ relationships with external units. Thus, internal and external units of the MNC 
are treated equal in this paper. Moreover, I focus on the subsidiary-level networks, in 
which I consider not only relationships with business actors but also with non-business 
actors, not only inter-organizational but also interpersonal relationships. Taking Hallen’s 
classification (1992) into consideration, I highlight the three levels of a subsidiary’s 
network, i.e. inter-firm network including relationships with both internal units (sister 
subsidiaries and headquarters) and external business firms (e.g. suppliers, customers, 
alliance partners, consultants); organization-centered infrastructural network including 
relationships with external non-business organizations; person-centered infrastructural 
network including managers’ business ties and social ties both personal-level.
7) I think internal units should belong to the headquarter-subsidiary network and subsidiary-subsidiary network identified 
by Welch and Welch (1993).
8) I think external units should be in the subsidiary-external environment network identified by Welch and Welch (1993).
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2. Learning Ownership Regulations through Networks
According to Duncan and Weiss (1979, in Weick, 1991), organizational learning is “the 
process within the organization by which knowledge about action-outcome relationships 
and the effect of the environment on these relationships is developed” 9). From this 
viewpoint, knowledge is the outcome of learning process. Previous studies such as 
Ford (1990) have highlighted the link between networks and organizational learning. 
Particularly, Welch and Welch (1996) suggested that the learning process underlying 
internationalization activities is closely related to the development and utilization of 
foreign networks. In terms of Delios and Beamish (1999), local knowledge of the host 
country includes political and legal rules and social norms for business transactions. From 
my point of view, part of the key knowledge about host country markets is created and 
maintained through network actors.
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) classify the knowledge of international markets into objective 
knowledge easily acquired and experiential knowledge that firms can accumulate only 
through engaging in international operations. Eriksson et al. (1997; 2000) identify 
three components of experiential knowledge: internationalization knowledge, business 
knowledge and institutional knowledge. Foreign institutional knowledge, the experiential 
knowledge of government, institutional framework, rules, norms and values, concerns 
institutions found in foreign markets, foreign governments and bureaucracies, and the 
ways in which these work. “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 
1990, p.3). These constraints include both formal and informal. In terms of Seyoum 
(2009), formal institutions include laws, regulations and rules that establish the basis for 
production, exchange and distribution, e.g. rules governing property rights or ownership 
rights. According to Karabay (2010), foreign ownership restriction is the most obvious 
way of restricting ownership shares of MNCs in foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, 
and many countries allow FDI only through ventures with local firms. On the other hand, 
emerging countries such as China have recently liberalized foreign ownership restrictions 
to some extent. Thus, rules governing foreign ownership shares and rights include not 
only restrictions but also promotions. In this paper, laws and regulations on foreign 
ownership restrictions and promotions are termed as foreign ownership regulations. 
According to Chen et al. (2009), informal institutions refer to rules and norms shaped by 
the industry and the society, and networks are regarded among informal institutions. Thus, 
institutional knowledge includes knowledge not only on formal institutions like foreign 
ownership regulations but also on informal institutions such as networks.
According to Murtha and Lenway (1994), foreign institutional knowledge is a source 
9) See Duncan and Weiss (1979, p. 84) in Weick, K.E. (1991): The nontraditional quality of organizational learning. 
Organization Science, 2 (1), pp. 116-124.
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of competitive advantage 10), and law enforcement in practice is even more important 
than what the law says particularly in emerging economies. Thus, it is insufficient 
to understand technical and commercial laws and norms in a foreign market without 
experiential institutional knowledge. In other words, knowledge beyond what formal 
institutions say cannot be obtained without informal institutions. In this paper, learning 
ownership regulations refers to obtaining, interpreting or confirming foreign ownership 
regulations in China. As the outcome of learning ownership regulations, knowledge 
about and particularly beyond what foreign ownership regulations say can be insufficient 
without such informal institutions as networks. Networks have been proved important in 
China. For example, Luo (2003) argued that relationship networks in China enable firms 
to countervail institutional uncertainties in the face of regulatory changes. According to 
Elango and Pattnaik (2007), one important source that MNC subsidiaries in emerging 
markets use to acquire foreign institutional knowledge is their networks. In my opinion, 
networks as informal institutions are used to acquire knowledge particularly beyond what 
formal institutions like foreign ownership regulations say. Stated differently, networks 
are used by MNC subsidiaries in emerging markets for learning foreign ownership 
regulations. These subsidiaries can obtain such knowledge not only directly through their 
own experiences in both organizational-level and personal-level networking with local 
actors such as host government and business partners, but also through experiences of 
other firms in headquarter-subsidiary and subsidiary-subsidiary networks, i.e. experiences 
of headquarters and sister subsidiaries.
Institutional knowledge is “information about the governance structures in specific 
countries and their rules, regulations, norms and values” (Eriksson et al., 2000, p. 29). 
Information is among the most important functions of a firm’s networks. Networks are a 
source of learning opportunities from outside the firm. Much of the critical information 
about foreign markets can be found in the network a MNC develops, especially key actors 
within the network. For example, Delios and Beamish (1999) considered relationships 
with local business partners essential to acquiring local knowledge. Information flow is 
among network resource flows. Nohria (1992, in Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001) noted 
that the MNC subsidiary may access internal resources held by connected actors in a 
network. Such internal resources include among other things internal information. Banerji 
and Sambharya (1996) stressed heavy information flows between network actors. The 
information flow includes information and knowledge not only gathered from connected 
business actors (Harrigan, 1986, in Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001), but also from 
nonbusiness actors in the network. According to Hallen (1992), when business relations 
10)  “a firm has a competitive advantage when it is able to create more economic value than rival firms.” (see page 10, 
Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage, Jay B. Barney and William S. Hesterly, 2012, 4.th ed., Pearson)
Cost leadership and differentiation are the two basic types of competitive advantage. (see page 3, Competitive Advantage: 
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Michael E. Porter, 1985, Free Press)
28 　　　　RITSUMEIKAN BUSINESS JOURNAL　Vol. 7
are absent, infrastructural networks are essential to obtain information. However, in my 
opinion, infrastructural networks can be more important than business relations with 
regard to acquiring institutional knowledge. Hadjikhani and Ghauri (2001) pointed out 
that business actors can obtain experience and information about values and activities 
of political actors through interaction with them. In this way, MNC subsidiaries obtain 
institutional knowledge by building up direct relationships with political actors such as 
the host government. On the other hand, Kogut (2000) contended that a firm can access 
wider knowledge base through its network of important suppliers, customers and other 
business partners. In this case, the firm’s business partners may become the intermediary 
in its relationship with government. For example, a large number of MNCs chose joint 
venturing with Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the initial entry into China in 
1980s and 1990s. As the SOEs are more familiar with Chinese policy than foreign MNCs, 
these MNCs can acquire institutional knowledge through their Chinese partners. Thus, 
MNC subsidiaries acquire institutional knowledge indirectly from their business partners. 
Moreover, personal ties are overlaid on the above relationships. Research on social 
networks underscores interpersonal ties. Uzzi (1996) argued that social networks make 
information not only transferable but also interpretable and valuable. Likewise, Rangan 
(2000) contended that wide and deep interpersonal business and private relationships 
bring about cheap, expeditious and effective information.
3. Post-Entry Mode Change and MNC Flexibility
Flexibility is a subject researched by a wide range of disciplines, from military strategy 
and economics, through strategic management and decision theory, to child psychology 
and environmental research. Flexibility is also a multi-faceted concept, including 
adaptability, agility, versatility, resilience and robustness (Bahrami and Evans, 2005). In 
other words, the content assigned to the concept varies from one author to another. Bruce 
Kogut (1985) argued that the MNC needs to create operational flexibility in order to profit 
from global strategies. Hence, it is also termed as strategic flexibility of the MNC. This 
concept is captured and termed as multinational flexibility by Bartlett et al. (2008). They 
define multinational flexibility as the ability of a company to manage the risks and exploit 
the opportunities that arise from the diversity and volatility of the global environment. 
I comply with this definition. However, I focus on such specific environment as foreign 
ownership regulations in China. Thus, flexibility is redefined as the MNC’s ability 
to manage the risks and exploit the opportunities that arise from the diversity and 
volatility of foreign ownership regulations in China, i.e. a specified formal institutional 
environment in a specified country rather than a variety of environment in the globe. In 
order to differentiate this flexibility from previous definitions, I term it MNC flexibility.
Although there has been a lot of research on initial entry mode choice, relatively little 
is studied about what Puck et al. (2009) noted as post-entry change of foreign firms’ 
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ownership forms, or as changes in ownership forms of operation abroad after initial entry. 
It points to the mode change based on the same operation. For instance, the Japanese 
company Omron initially established a joint venture in Shanghai in 1993. In 2005, 
however, this joint venture was changed to a wholly Japanese-owned enterprise through 
Omron’s acquisition of shareholding owned by the local partner, a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise (SOE). Another Japanese company Sato Metal set up a representative office 
in Shanghai in 1999. Later in 2005, this office was changed to a wholly Sato-owned 
enterprise. A more interesting example is the Japanese company Hitachi Cable, which set 
up a wholly owned subsidiary in Shanghai in 1994. A few years later, this subsidiary was 
changed to a joint venture. But after a while, this joint venture was again changed back to 
wholly Japanese-owned enterprise.
Uppsala model or stages theory advocates that the process of internationalization is 
incremental in the sequence of ‘export via an agent—sales subsidiary (acquisition of the 
agent or organized around employees of the agent)—local production’ (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). In other words, if a MNC chooses exporting as the initial entry mode, 
it will give up exporting to set up sales subsidiary, and later change the same sales 
subsidiary to local production. According to Buckley and Casson (1981), the evolution 
of MNC entry modes is from export through licensing to FDI, but the MNC may expand 
directly from exporting to FDI skipping licensing in some cases, and in other cases, 
may evolve only from exporting to licensing but not from licensing to FDI. Thus, if the 
MNC chooses exporting when entering the foreign market, it may give up exporting 
to utilize licensing and later change the licensee to joint venture partner (or give up 
licensing to directly set up wholly owned venture). The “post-entry changes of foreign 
firms’ ownership forms”, “process of internationalization”, and “evolution of MNC entry 
modes”, all can indicate the way by which MNCs may change their operation modes after 
initially entering the foreign markets. We term this “post-entry mode change”, which 
is defined as the MNC changes its mode of operation after initial entry into a foreign 
market.
It should be noticed that “evolution of MNC entry modes” and “process of 
internationalization” include more than post-entry mode change. The evolution (Buckley 
and Casson, 1981) can also mean that the MNC chooses exporting when initially entering 
a foreign market and later accrues licensing or/and FDI as entry modes for new operations 
while keeping exporting. Similarly, the sequential internationalization process (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977) can also include the situation that a MNC chooses exporting initially, 
later accrues sales subsidiary and finally local production in new entries. For example, the 
Japanese company Suzuki began providing technology for Chinese market in 1984, later 
set up a representative office in Beijing in 1995, during the same year, established joint 
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ventures in Jiangxi11) and Chongqing12), and set up a wholly owned venture in Beijing 
in 2004. Until present, these affiliates exist simultaneously. These mode changes in 
subsequent/late entries are different from post-entry mode change.
Many MNCs change their operation modes after initial entry into China (Ye, 2011). In 
that article, the ‘change of operation modes’ refers to both post-entry mode change and 
subsequent entry mode change. However, this paper excludes consideration of subsequent 
entry mode change. More importantly, for the sake of research focus, post-entry mode 
change is specified as the MNC changes to wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) 
after initial entry as joint venture (JV, including Chinese-foreign Cooperative Enterprise 
and Chinese-foreign joint venture).
4. A Theoretical Framework 
In this paper, I have specified post-entry mode change as the change from initial JV 
to WFOE. What motivates this type of change? How can the motives be related to the 
complex foreign ownership regulations in China? Foreign ownership regulations are not 
consistent for all industries in China, and may not be coherent in the same industry due 
to spatial and temporal disparities. As a result, simply considering foreign ownership 
regulations in motivating post-entry mode change is not reasonable, even though the 
change can be directly related to the regulations in certain occasions.
The foreign ownership regulation is among formal institutions, and thus knowledge 
about the regulation—as the outcome of learning it—is among formal institutional 
knowledge. The most important part of such knowledge is the meaning behind what 
foreign ownership regulations say literally. Such knowledge is the outcome of not only 
obtaining but also interpreting or confirming what foreign ownership regulations say. 
Such knowledge is insufficient without informal institutions. Among informal institutions, 
relationship networks are indispensible in China. Relationship networks are called Guanxi 
networks in China, although Hackley and Dong (2001) pointed out the difficulty to find 
an equivalent English word to accurately express the meaning of Guanxi, since it is a 
unique social and cultural phenomenon deeply rooted in Chinese culture and gradually 
developed throughout the thousand-year-old society. Yan (1996, in Hackley and Dong, 
2001) defined Guanxi as a strategically constructed network of personal relationships. In 
Chinese society, however, Guanxi is considered not only personal but also organizational 
relationships. Yang and Wang (2011) also argued that Guanxi refers to dynamic, 
interactive relationships at both individual and organizational levels. Hence, in this paper, 
Guanxi or relationship networks are referred to as including a business organization’s 
11)  Jiangxi is the name of a province in China.
12)  Chongqing is the name of a municipality in China, which is important in western China and governed directly by 
Chinese central government.
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relationships with other business or non-business organizations, and a business person’s 
relationships with other business or social persons. For instance, a business manager 
builds up relationships with his/her colleagues in the same company, or with employees of 
relational companies such as supplier and customer, or with his/her friends and relatives. 
It has to be noticed that family or kinship tends to be the center of Guanxi or relationship 
networks in China. Empirical studies such as Peng and Luo (2000) provide evidence on 
the importance of relationship networks in China. They are important for firm behavior 
and even more important for firm growth in transitional economies (Peng and Heath, 
1996). Thus, relationship networks are a source of knowledge beyond what foreign 
ownership regulations say, and are vehicles in learning ownership regulations particularly 
interpreting or confirming what the regulations say.
A subsidiary’s relationship networks are composed of its relations with headquarters and 
sister subsidiaries, external business firms such as suppliers and consultant companies, 
external non-business organizations like government, as well as managerial ties. Which 
kind of relationship or Guanxi networks is superior and which kind inferior to learning 
ownership regulations? We assume that the network featured by embedded relations 
with multiple actors or with only a few key actors is superior to learning ownership 
regulations. In contrast, the network in which neither multiple sources of actors nor key 
actors are connected is inferior to learning ownership regulations. The purpose of building 
up a superior relationship or Guanxi network for a subsidiary is to acquire a better source 
of knowledge beyond what foreign ownership regulations say.
The information flow shaped by relationship networks provides both opportunities and 
risks for firms and influences their strategic behavior (Gulati, 1999). Accordingly, in the 
current research, the essence of learning ownership regulations is regarded as learning 
opportunities and risks that arise from the complex foreign ownership regulations in 
China. Such learning enables MNC subsidiaries to exploit these opportunities and manage 
these risks. In other words, learning ownership regulations through relationship networks 
influences MNC flexibility—MNC’s ability to exploit opportunities and manage risks 
that arise from the diversity and volatility of foreign ownership regulations in China. Not 
all the MNCs recognize the importance of establishing superior networks. Even if they 
do, not all are able to establish such networks. Hence, learning ownership regulations is 
excellent for some MNCs but insufficient for others. Excellent learning opportunities and 
risks that arise from foreign ownership regulations enhances MNC’s ability to manage 
these opportunities and risks—MNC flexibility. On the contrary, insufficient such learning 
decreases MNC flexibility.
Furthermore, firm capability of dealing with environmental opportunities and risks is 
important to its strategic choice. We assume that enhanced MNC flexibility motivates 
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post-entry mode change from initial JV to WFOE. Thus, we develop the following 
theoretical framework:
Relationship networks influence learning ownership regulations, such learning affects 
MNC flexibility, which in turn influences post-entry mode change (see Diagram 1). 
Surrounding the motivation of post-entry mode change, the framework can be specified 
as follows: 
Superior networks facilitate excellent learning ownership regulations, such excellent 
learning leads to enhanced MNC flexibility, which in turn motivates post-entry mode 
change from JV to WFOE.
Methodology
Data Collection
Through Toyo Keizai13) and company websites (These websites are not revealed for the 
sake of company confidentiality), I chose 20 Japanese MNC subsidiaries in Shanghai. 
Shanghai is one of the most developed metropolitans in China and has long become 
an investment hotspot for foreign particularly Japanese firms, perhaps because of its 
geographic proximity to Japan. During 1980s and 1990s, MNCs headquartered in Japan 
invested 507 branches in Shanghai excluding representative offices, 30% of all Japanese 
branches in China during the same period, leading Chinese provinces, municipalities and 
other administrative areas (Toyo Keizai, 2011) 14). The main objective of this research 
was to explore what caused post-entry mode change from JVs to WFOEs. As a result, all 
the 20 subsidiaries chosen were set up as JVs during 1990s but were changed to WFOEs 
during 2000s. During 2010, I did a survey on these 20 subsidiaries by email, telephone 
and/or fax to ask if I could interview their top managers. Despite various difficulties 
in contacting these companies, I finally visited 3 out of the 20 wholly Japanese-owned 
enterprises in Shanghai (companies A, B, C) and interviewed their managers. The 
interview results were primary components of case studies.
Measurement by Interview Questions
The interviews were semi-structured (part of the interview questions see appendix 1).
Previously, no empirical studies examined foreign ownership regulations quantitatively. 
13)  Toyo Keizai’s micro-data: Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Directory of Japanese Subsidiaries Abroad). More 
information can be found at http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Common/publication/DP/DP394.pdf.
Such directories have been published once a year and for a few decades. Whether these subsidiaries were joint venture 
or wholly Japanese owned at the point of establishment or whether they have ever been changed from joint to wholly 
Japanese-owned venture usually cannot be observed from only one year’s directory. Consequently, the author combined 
various years’ directories as well as company websites (when necessary), in order to find subsidiaries that have been 
changed from joint ventures to wholly Japanese-owned enterprises.
14)  Toyo Keizai’s Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran: CD-ROM-ban 2011 (Directory of Japanese Subsidiaries
Abroad: CD-ROM version 2011). The number 507 can be observed directly in the CD-ROM, while the number 30% was 
calculated by the author through observations in it.
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This paper tried to fill this gap by setting original questions. Although foreign ownership 
regulations in China are complex, I focus on two primary aspects in order to examine 
effectively. One is various versions of “Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment 
in Industries” (the Catalogues). The other is industry-specific ownership regulations. 
Thus, the extent to which the subsidiary knows about these two dimensions of foreign 
ownership regulations was asked respectively. Answers were measured on a 7-point likert 
scale15) where 1 denoted ‘very little’ and 7 denoted ‘very much’. Such design of scale has 
been common to assess ‘extent’ or ‘degree’. For instance, Peng and Luo (2000) measured 
the extent of ties with relevant network actors on a 7-point scale, ranging from ‘very 
little’ to ‘very extensive’. Answers to the two questions on foreign ownership regulations 
were averaged to create a composite measure of ‘learning ownership regulations’. Such 
composite measurement using multiple questions (indicators) to measure the same 
construct also has been popular (e.g. Forsgren et al., 2005).
Interviewees were asked to identify relationships important to their obtaining, interpreting 
or confirming foreign ownership regulations in China. Not only the number of influential 
actors but also the analysis of key actors in the network for learning foreign ownership 
regulations was useful to elaborate relationship networks.
Answers to the open-ended questions “Was this change related to foreign ownership 
regulations in China? If not, what factors caused this change?” and “Why didn’t your 
company change the operation mode immediately after deregulation?” demonstrated 
related process, through which MNC flexibility as well as its intermediate role between 
learning ownership regulations and post-entry mode change were analyzed.
Analysis and Results
Company A
This company is a subsidiary of a Japanese multinational corporation (MNC) in Shanghai, 
China. It is engaged in the production and sales in the electronics industry. It was 
established as a Chinese-foreign joint venture with a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
in 1993, with the Japanese MNC holding majority share. Later in 2005, it was changed to 
a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE).
3 persons were interviewed simultaneously—Japanese general manager, Chinese 
department manager, and Interpreter. The general manager was relatively new comer, 
15)  A Likert scale, named after its inventor-psychologist Rensis Likert, is the most widely used approach to scaling 
responses in survey research. Respondents specify their level of agreement or disagreement on a symmetric agree-
disagree scale for a series of statements. Thus, responses are scored along a range, capturing the intensity of their feelings 
for a given item.
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while the department manager had worked for the company for over 10 years and been 
quite familiar with the company’s developmental progress. Languages used include 
Chinese, Japanese and English. The interview lasted for one hour.
According to the managers, foreign ownership regulations in China might be one 
of the reasons causing the change from JV to WFOE, but were not the main reason. 
Learning (obtaining, interpreting and confirming) the policy change was important to the 
ownership change only to some extent, say, 20%-30%. The ownership change from JV to 
WFOE was mainly attributed to three reasons. Firstly, at the time of change, the Japanese 
MNC intended to invest a project which is lucrative. But the process of the Chinese 
SOE to make a decision on the investment was complex and slow. In order not to miss 
the opportunity to invest and make a profit, the Japanese MNC decided to buy the share 
owned by the Chinese SOE. Secondly, the Chinese SOE did not have enough cash to 
invest. Even if it agreed the project, it could not invest immediately. Thirdly, more profit 
and control would be made with the establishment of a WFOE.
Its industrial sector, which is listed in the encouraged category in the 1995 Catalogue, has 
been allowed to set up WFOE since 1995. However, the company kept being a JV until 
2005. In 1995, the company was young and still needed the Chinese SOE to positioning 
in Chinese market and networking with the local government. With the establishment 
of market position and the decreased importance of Chinese SOE in networking with 
government, the company was changed to WFOE after being JV for over 10 years. 
However, according to the managers, if the Chinese SOE was not so weak in the ability to 
invest, the Japanese MNC would not change the venture from JV to WFOE.
According to the managers, the company’s relationships with its customer companies, 
with its headquarter especially law consultants in the Chinese headquarter, with 
government, and its managers’ relationships with friends including alumni, former 
colleagues, friends in social clubs such as Golf club and Japanese manager club, friends’ 
friends, are important to learning foreign ownership regulations. Nevertheless, the most 
important source should be the inner networking among Japanese headquarter, Chinese 
headquarter and the company.
According to the managers, they have extremely excellent learning in the Catalogues 
(score on 7), and have excellent learning on industry-specific ownership regulations (score 
on 5). They regard the Catalogues as opportunities and simultaneously as risks for the 
company’s operation. The managers extremely agree “how a policy is enforced in practice 
at a particular time by a particular government agency is more important than what the 
policy says”.
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Company B
This company is a subsidiary of a Japanese multinational corporation (MNC) in Shanghai, 
China. It is engaged in the production and sales in the pharmaceutical industry. It was 
established as a Chinese-foreign cooperative enterprise between the Japanese MNC and 
a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in 1999, with the Japanese MNC holding 95% 
of the total share. Later the Japanese MNC changed its shareholding to 98%, and finally 
in 2007, changed to 100%. Thus, the company was changed to a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE).
Chinese administrative director of this company was interviewed. He has been very 
familiar with the company’s developmental progress and has constructive ideas about 
operation modes. Hence, the language used is Chinese. The interview lasted for one hour.
According to the director, the ownership change from JV to WFOE was related to 
foreign ownership regulations in China. Learning ownership regulations was important 
to the company’s ownership change to the extent of 80%. The Japanese MNC intended 
to establish a WFOE at the beginning, but this was not permitted by Chinese policy. 
Thus, the Japanese MNC adopted the suggestion of law consultants to set up a JV and 
was preparing for the change to a WFOE. After its industrial sector was listed in the 
encouraged categories of the 2002 Catalogue, the company was changed to WFOE. 
However, the ownership change did not happen immediately after the change of 
ownership regulations. In the initial cooperative agreement of the two partners, it was 
stipulated that the Japanese partner could not set up WFOE until the Chinese partner 
recouped all the investment.
According to the director, relationships important to learning ownership regulations 
include those with strategic alliance partners, the government, business/industrial 
associations, law consultants, managers of other companies, and managers’ friends 
(alumni, former colleagues, friends in social clubs and friends in the government). 
However, the most important is the relationship with the government. Moreover, 
law consultants have influenced the company’s learning (obtaining, interpreting and 
confirming) ownership regulations to a great extent. Among them, 70% are government 
consultants who provide the policy information, 30% are private consultant corporations 
which keep strong networking with the government and research on the policy 
information obtained. Thus, the company has adopted multiple sources of law consultant 
to obtain, interpret and confirm the changing policy including ownership regulations.
According to the director, they have extremely excellent learning in the Catalogues 
(score on 7) and excellent learning on industry-specific ownership regulations (score on 
6). They do not any more regard the Catalogues as great opportunities or huge risks for 
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the company’s operation. The director agrees “how a policy is enforced in practice at a 
particular time by a particular government agency is more important than what the policy 
says”.
Additionally, the director highlighted the importance of Chinese partner who could 
obtain more development opportunities for the company, thus express the opinion that 
continuing to be JV might be better than changing to WFOE. As it is difficult to have 
post-entry mode change, most MNCs prefer to change operation mode in their late entries 
if the change can benefit.
Company C
This company is a subsidiary of a Japanese multinational corporation (MNC) in Shanghai, 
China. It is engaged in the industry of environment pollution control, which has been 
listed in the encouraged category of the 1995 Catalogue, meaning its industry has been 
allowed to set up WFOE even before the company’s initiation. Nevertheless, the company 
was established as a Chinese-foreign joint venture with a Chinese state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) in 1997, with the Japanese MNC holding 65% of the total share. Later in 2000, the 
Japanese MNC changed its shareholding to 90%, and finally in 2007, changed to 100%. 
From then on, the company became a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE).
2 persons were interviewed simultaneously—Chinese vice general manager and Chinese 
administrative director. Both have worked in the company for many years and been 
familiar with the company’s developmental progress. The language used is Chinese. The 
interview lasted for one hour.
According to the managers, the ownership change from JV to WFOE was irrelevant 
to foreign ownership regulations in China. Learning ownership regulations was not 
important at all to the company’s ownership change. The ownership change was caused 
by the market, management mode and corporate culture. At the time of establishment in 
1997, foreigners were prohibited to apply for the kind of qualification which has been 
necessary to operation in the environment pollution control industry. In order to use the 
qualification of Chinese partner, the Japanese MNC set up JV with the Chinese partner. 
However, the qualification of Chinese partner was not so useful to the company, as most 
clients were Japanese companies and the Chinese qualification was not needed. Thus, the 
Japanese MNC wanted to buy shares from the Chinese partner. On the other hand, the 
JV had made a loss for a few years since establishment. Without profit and lack of cash, 
the Chinese partner proposed to withdraw shares in 2005. As a result, the company was 
changed to WFOE without any difficulties.
According to the managers, the relationship with headquarter in Japan is very important 
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to learning ownership regulations, relationships with law consultant and managers of 
other companies are important to some extent. Ties with strategic alliance partners are 
very weak. When the Chinese qualification is needed occasionally, the company tends to 
find a temporary Chinese partner.
According to the managers, they have extremely excellent learning on industry-specific 
ownership regulations (score on 7) but only have learning in the Catalogues to some 
extent (score on 4). They regard the Catalogues not as opportunities but as huge risks 
for the company’s operation. The managers totally agree “how a policy is enforced in 
practice at a particular time by a particular government agency is more important than 
what the policy says”.
Cross-Case Analysis
All the cases show that relationship networks are important to learning government 
policies such as foreign ownership regulations. Hence, various subsidiary networks 
constitute a complex web for learning ownership regulations. However, the constituents 
in the web tend to be discrepant for different subsidiaries (see figures 1, 2, 3). All the 
3 subsidiaries are featured by superior networks, although the way of superiority is 
disparate. Both company A and company B are connected with multiple influential actors 
in their webs. Simultaneously, a few key actors exist in both webs. Nonetheless, key 
actors are different. For company A, the most important actors are Chinese headquarter 
and Japanese headquarter, while for company B, government and law consultants. 
Moreover, company B set up relations with and reliance on multiple sources of law 
consultant. Government consultants accounting for 70% provide policy information. 
Private consultant corporations which account for the left 30% and are closely connected 
with the government justify the policy information. In contrast, company C is embedded 
in a sparse network, with only one key actor—Japanese headquarter. This headquarter in 
Japan may have a variety of contacts such as government and managerial ties for learning 
foreign ownership regulations in China, thus being intermediary between company C and 
those contacts. All the 3 subsidiaries get high scores in learning ownership regulations 
(6 for company A, 6.5 for company B, 5.5 for company C). As a consequence, superior 
networks contribute to excellent learning ownership regulations.
Company A’s excellent learning on foreign ownership regulations—particularly 
interpreting and confirming through its superior networks such opportunities as 
permission to establish WFOE—enhanced its ability to exploit these opportunities. Such 
enhanced MNC flexibility, in turn, facilitated its change to WFOE. Similarly, company 
B’s excellent learning about opportunities to establish WFOE from foreign ownership 
regulations—with the help especially of law consultants—enhanced its ability to exploit 
such opportunities and in turn facilitated its change to WFOE. Company C was changed 
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to WFOE after the Japanese MNC was allowed to apply for the necessary qualification in 
China, suggesting that its excellent learning about opportunities from foreign ownership 
regulations enhanced its ability to exploit the opportunities. Consequently, enhanced 
MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations can motivate post-entry 
mode change from JV to WFOE.
All of the 3 companies had been JVs before changing to WFOEs. The Japanese MNC 
now owning company C was already allowed by the Catalogues to set up WFOE at the 
beginning (1997), but it could not apply for the necessary industry-specific qualification 
in 1997, and thus it established a JV with a Chinese partner who had owned the 
qualification. This in fact shows how important enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent 
learning ownership regulations is to its keeping JV before post-entry mode change. 
As industry-specific regulations can make effect and may be taken priority over the 
Catalogues, the Japanese MNC learned about risks from foreign ownership regulations. 
It had kept a JV just because its excellent learning on foreign ownership regulations 
enhanced MNC flexibility, particularly its ability to manage risks arisen. Similarly, 
company B had been kept as JV before permission to establish WFOE in 2002, because 
its excellent learning about risks from foreign ownership regulations enhanced its ability 
to manage these risks. Likewise, company A’s keeping JV before permission to set up 
WFOE in 1995 was due to its enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning about 
risks particularly from the Catalogues. In this situation, MNC flexibility especially 
refers to its ability to manage these risks. Thus, it can be inferred from the before-
change situations that keeping JV after initial entry as JV in some cases is attributed to 
enhanced MNC flexibility (particularly the ability to manage risks) by excellent learning 
ownership regulations (particularly learning about risks). Combing the situations that 
initial JVs were changed to WFOEs, we can generally say that enhanced MNC flexibility 
by excellent learning ownership regulations can motivate not only post-entry mode 
change from JV to WFOE but also keeping JV. Specifically, however, ‘enhanced MNC 
flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations motivates post-entry mode change’ 
is particularly related to opportunities, while ‘enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent 
learning ownership regulations motivates keeping JV’ is especially relevant to risks.
Although enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations is 
essential to post-entry mode change of company B and company C, it seems not always 
be the key factor. In terms of the managers’ opinion, company A’s change from JV 
to WFOE was mainly attributed to reasons other than MNC flexibility influenced by 
learning ownership regulations. Firstly, at the time of change, the Japanese MNC intended 
to invest a project which is lucrative. But the process of the Chinese SOE to make a 
decision on the investment was complex and slow. In order not to miss the opportunity 
to invest and make a profit, the Japanese MNC decided to buy the share owned by the 
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Chinese SOE. Secondly, the Chinese SOE did not have enough cash to invest. Even if it 
agreed the project, it could not invest immediately. Thirdly, more profit and control would 
be made with the establishment of a WFOE. However, company A would not change to 
WFOE without the change of ownership regulations from restriction to promotion.
It can be inferred that enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership 
regulations may not always be taken priority over other factors to influence keeping JV. 
Company A had kept as JV for 10 years even after permission to establish WFOE. At 
that time, the company was young and still needed the Chinese partner for positioning in 
Chinese market and networking with the local government. In other words, its post-entry 
mode change did not happen until the establishment of market position and the decreased 
importance of Chinese partner in networking with government. This complies with 
the finding of Makino and Delios (1996) that the utility of joint venturing with a local 
partner compared to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary decreased with greater levels 
of international experience due to the foreign firm’s development of local knowledge. 
Company B had kept as JV for 5 years after permission to set up WFOE. In the initial 
cooperative agreement of the two partners, it was stipulated that the Japanese partner 
could not establish WFOE until the Chinese partner recouped all the investment.
Discussion
It seems that enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations 
through superior networks may not always be the decisive factor motivating post-
entry mode change. Nevertheless, without excellent learning about foreign ownership 
regulations in China and related opportunities and risks, Japanese companies would 
not initiate post-entry mode change from JV to WFOE, even if they want to have more 
control and profits. Although managers of company A and company C stated that learning 
ownership regulations are not so important to their companies’ post-entry mode change, 
the above case analysis showed the opposite.
Foreign ownership regulations in China vary in industries and involve various 
government agencies and thus policies, increasing the complexity of learning ownership 
regulations. In automobile component industry, restrictions have been relaxed gradually. 
At the beginning, only JV was allowed. After a while, some products were opened 
for WFOE. Finally, most automobile components have been allowed for WFOE. In 
automobile industry, although WFOE is never permitted, when and how the restriction 
will change is uncertain. The function of learning ownership regulations is to decrease 
the uncertainty. Furthermore, the enforcement of foreign ownership regulations is 
flexible within some scope. For example, logistics industry was limited to JV generally 
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but permitted for WFOE at Zhangjiagang Free Trade Zone16) in 1990s. With the help of 
Free Trade Zone Administration Committee, the Japanese logistics company Marukyo 
established its wholly-owned subsidiary within such a special area in 1994. Meanwhile, 
following the law consultant’s suggestion, Marukyo set up a Chinese domestic company 
outside of the Free Trade Zone in 2000, with a Chinese employee registered as Chairman 
of the company. In this way, Marukyo had operated in China before logistics industry 
was opened for WFOE in 2003.17) Thus, excellent learning ownership regulations can be 
essential for any foreign company operating in China, whether or not its managers realize 
the essentiality.
Without building up superior Guanxi or relationship networks, excellent learning 
particularly interpreting and confirming ownership regulations is impossible, because 
China is a society of Guanxi or relationship networks. Guanxi is pervasive in every aspect 
of the business and social world in China, and its essentiality for firm survival and growth 
has been proved by previous studies such as Peng and Luo (2000). Guanxi network is 
an important form of social capital in China. According to Xin and Pearce (1996), social 
capital theory treats Guanxi network as an invaluable resource for management involving 
informal exchanges of social obligations. Chen and Wu (2011) argued that people turn to 
Guanxi network when formal institutions are unavailable. Thus, Guanxi or relationship 
networks can be regarded among informal institutions and as a substitute for formal 
institutions in China (Chen et al., 2009; Peng and Heath, 1996; Luo, 2003). In this paper, 
however, we treat the informal institutions—Guanxi or relationship networks, not as a 
substitute for formal institutions but as a means of learning formal institutions. In terms 
of Chen et al. (2009), formal institutions in China are often confusing or conflicting 
and information got from relationship networks becomes more reliable and valuable. 
Nevertheless, Guanxi networks become less important with gradually improved formal 
market-oriented institutions (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008). Hence, for the Guanxi or 
relationship network, being a means of obtaining information beyond what laws and 
regulations write is more reasonable than completely substituting for formal institutions. 
Establishing and maintaining superior relationship networks and thus obtaining excellent 
information beyond what foreign ownership regulations say becomes essential to post-
entry mode change from JV to WFOE.
The superior network of company C is featured by embedded relations with only a 
few actors, particularly one key actor—Japanese headquarter. Corporate and regional 
16)  A special area in Jiangsu province of China, within which goods may be landed, handled, manufactured or 
reconfigured, and re-exported without the intervention of the customs authorities. Only when the goods are moved to 
consumers within the country in which the zone is located do they become subject to the prevailing customs duties.
Though a municipality directly administered by China’ central government, Shanghai is actually located in Jiangsu 
province.
17)  The author visited Marukyo Transportation and Trade Co., Ltd. in Shanghai and interviewed its general manager.
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headquarters are among the most important functions within the MNC. According to 
Dicken (1998), the corporate headquarter processes and transmits information to and 
from other parts of the MNC, while the regional headquarter intermediates between the 
corporate headquarter and its affiliates within its specific region. In addition, corporate 
headquarters handle relationships and information with high-level organizations such as 
major business service providers (financial, legal or advertising) and major departments of 
foreign/domestic governments. However, in my view, whether the corporate headquarter 
or the subsidiary establishes and manages relationships with external business as well 
as nonbusiness actors relies on the MNC strategies. In terms of Murtha and Lenway 
(1994), usually, MNCs based in pluralist countries such as USA tend to adopt nationally 
responsive strategies. I argue that subsidiaries in this case tend to be more autonomous 
in dealing with relationships in the embedded networks. Murtha and Lenway (1994) also 
posited that MNCs headquartered in corporatist countries such as Japan prefer global 
integration strategies, which centralize most value chain activities in the home country 
and treat the world as a unified market served through national market and sales affiliates. 
I contend that under this circumstance corporate headquarters exert more control over 
subsidiaries and hence over their relations with local networks. Besides company C, 
company A also falls into the typical Japanese strategies and is more controlled by their 
headquarters. As a result, headquarters are the most important for them with regard to 
learning ownership regulations.
Direct links with Chinese government are crucial to both company A and company 
B. Company A may have set up direct connection with local government and thus 
depreciated the importance of previous JV partner (Chinese SOE) in networking with 
government. In this situation, however, law consultants tend be intermediaries in the 
relationship with government, substituting for local business partners especially JV 
partners. This may explain why the most important sources to company B’s learning 
ownership regulations are government and its related law consultants, and why law 
consultants are essential to all the three companies. Bjorkman and Kock (1995) argued 
that the Chinese intermediary's relationships with government officials within a particular 
province are so strong that the foreign firm is able to extend market prospects through 
these relationships. Welch and Welch (1996) noted that part of such relationships remains 
unseen even though it may come into play over time. Blankenburg and Johanson (1992) 
further pointed out that such ambiguity will reinforce as the extent and complexity of 
such relationships expands over time. In China, intermediaries have their own networks 
producing unexpected connections. Accordingly, Welch and Welch (1996) asserted that 
it is difficult for MNCs to understand in advance which relationships ought to be formed 
and whether the Chinese intermediary owns the appropriate network. Thus, company B 
adopted various law consultants as multiple sources of learning the government policy.
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Both individual learning and organizational learning are important (Welch and Welch, 
1996). Thus, from network perspective, both personal-level and organizational-level 
networks influence learning. According to Welch and Welch (1993), people are key links 
in relationship networks, which are established and maintained via personal contacts. 
Manager’s business ties as well as social ties are highlighted in the case studies. For 
example, former colleagues are a source of learning such policy as foreign ownership 
regulations in both company A and company B. Former staff can function as continuing 
sources of information even working for competitors. Nevertheless, Welch and Welch 
(1996) noted that whether former staff can be powerful in information transfer relies on 
the strength of relationships between former and current staff.
Conclusion
In order to explore what motivates the MNC’s post-entry mode change from joint 
venture (JV) to wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE), we highlighted the complex 
foreign ownership regulations in China, by looking at learning such regulations through 
relationship networks and the resulted MNC flexibility. Thus, a theoretical framework 
was developed assuming that MNC flexibility influenced by learning ownership 
regulations through relationship networks affects post-entry mode change. In this paper, 
it was examined whether enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership 
regulations through superior networks motivates post-entry mode change from JV to 
WFOE, i.e. whether superior networks facilitate excellent learning ownership regulations, 
whether such learning leads to enhanced MNC flexibility, and whether the enhanced 
MNC flexibility in turn motivates post-entry mode change.
Case studies on 3 Japanese subsidiaries in China that have changed from initial JVs 
to WFOEs partially exemplified the framework. Superior networks facilitate excellent 
learning ownership regulations, although the way of superiority is disparate in different 
companies. Enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations 
can motivate post-entry mode change, under the circumstance that enhanced MNC 
flexibility particularly refers to enhanced ability to exploit opportunities and excellent 
learning particularly relates to excellent learning through superior networks opportunities 
arisen from foreign ownership regulations. Although such enhanced MNC flexibility 
unexpectedly can motivate keeping JV, the nature is particularly about excellent learning 
risks and enhanced ability to manage these risks. As a result, the original proposition can 
be supported contingent upon excellent learning opportunities and enhanced ability to 
exploit these opportunities.
It seems that enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations 
through superior networks may not be the key to post-entry mode change. However, in 
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Chinese context, Guanxi and relationship networks are so important and popular in every 
aspect of the social life that learning particularly interpreting and confirming foreign 
ownership regulations in China depends on the quality of such networking. In turn, the 
quality of learning ownership regulations determines MNC flexibility and thus post-entry 
mode change. As a consequence, the most important factor influencing post-entry mode 
change should be enhanced MNC flexibility by excellent learning ownership regulations 
through superior networks, no matter what the managers subjectively consider the key 
factor(s).
The motivation of keeping JV is as important as that of post-entry mode change according 
to the case study results. Thus, the theoretical framework can also be specified as—
Inferior networks lead to insufficient learning ownership regulations, which results 
in decreased MNC flexibility, which in turn motivates keeping JV. Furthermore, the 
conclusion about keeping JV was only inferred from the study of Japanese subsidiaries 
with post-entry mode change, rather than directly drawn on those with keeping JV. Hence, 
it will be necessary and fascinating to study Japanese subsidiaries that have been kept as 
JVs, in order to further examine the theoretical framework.
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions
1. Has your company ever changed from joint venture (JV) to wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
(WFOE)?
Yes (   )      No (   )
the year of establishing a JV:
the year of becoming a WFOE (if applicable):
2. Was this change related to foreign ownership regulations in China? If not, what factors caused this 
change?
3. Why didn’t your company change the operation mode immediately after deregulation?
4. Which of the following relationships are important to your obtaining, interpreting and confirming 
foreign ownership regulations in China?
(   ) relationships with suppliers
(   ) relationships with customers
(   ) relationships with strategic alliance partners
(   ) relationships with headquarter in China (if applicable)
(   ) relationships with headquarter in Japan
(   ) relationships with sister subsidiaries in China
(   ) relationships with law consultants
(   ) relationships with Chinese government
(   ) relationships with business associations
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(   ) relationships with managers of other companies
(   ) relationships with friends (please state what kind of friends, for example, friends in social clubs, 
friends in the government etc.) _______________
(   ) other relationships, please state______________________
5. To what extent do you know foreign ownership regulations in China?
(1) Industry-specific ownership regulations 
very little  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  very much
(2) Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industries (the Catalogues)
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